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Abstract. The research community made enormous progress in the
past years in developing algorithms for verifying software, as shown by
international competitions. Unfortunately, the transfer into industrial
practice is slow. A reason for this might be that the verification tools
do not connect well to the developer work-flow. This paper presents
a solution to this problem: We use verification witnesses as interface
between verification tools and the testing process that every developer
is familiar with. Many modern verification tools report, in case a bug is
found, an error path as exchangeable verification witness. Our approach
is to synthesize a test from each witness, such that the developer can
inspect the verification result using familiar technology, such as debug-
gers, profilers, and visualization tools. Moreover, this approach identifies
the witnesses as an interface between formal verification and testing:
Developers can use arbitrary (witness-producing) verification tools, and
arbitrary converters from witnesses to tests; we implemented two such
converters. We performed a large experimental study to confirm that our
proposed solution works well in practice: Out of 18 966 verification results
obtained from 21 verifiers, 14 727 results were confirmed by witness-based
result validation, and 10 080 of these results were confirmed alone by
extracting and executing tests, meaning that the desired specification
violation was effectively observed. We thus show that our approach is
directly and immediately applicable to verification results produced by
software verifiers that adhere to the international standard for verification
witnesses.
1 Introduction
Automatic software verification, i.e., using methods from program analysis and
model checking to find out whether a program satisfies or violates a given specifi-
cation, is a successful and mature technology. The efficiency and effectiveness
of the available verification tools for C programs is shown in the annual com-
petition on software verification [5]. Despite this success story in research, the
state-of-the-art in practice is that not many software projects have such verifi-
cation tools incorporated into their software-development process. The reason
for this gap between availability of technology on the one side and missed op-
portunities on the other side is perhaps twofold: (a) developers are frustrated
by false alarms, i.e., in the past, static analyzers reported too many bugs that
were not observable in a concrete program execution, and thus, developers have
lost confidence in bug reports [20]; (b) there is a lack of appropriate interfacing,
i.e., it is difficult for developers to leverage advantages of the verification tools
because they are difficult to integrate and difficult to learn from [1].
To overcome these two problems, we propose (i) to use verifiers that produce
verification witnesses, i.e., abstract descriptions of one or more paths to a speci-
fication violation (many such tools are already available 1), and (ii) to validate
whether a real bug has been found by constructing a test from the produced
verification witness and observing the execution of that test. This way, issue (a)
above is solved because, if the test execution does show and thus confirm the
reported specification violation, the verification result can be examined with
high confidence and on a concrete, executable example (e.g., with a debugger),
and issue (b) is solved because we bridge the gap between the, in most projects,
unfamiliar domain of verification and the established domain of testing, which
makes it easier to integrate verification into the development process.
Execution-based Validation of Witnesses. Witness validation based on
model-checking technology works well [4, 5, 9, 14], but the disadvantage is that
due to over-approximation, the validation might be as imprecise as the verification
step. A verification witness serves as a (potentially coarse) description of a part
of the state space of a program that contains a specification violation, and
the witness validators can confirm or reject the error report. We complement
the witness-validation technology by direct test execution: A test case (e.g.,
unit-test code) is built from the violation witness, and this test case provides
a precise and transparent way to confirm and examine it.2 By observing and
analyzing an execution that exposes undesirable behavior, developers can convince
themselves that the error report is correct, and address the reported bugs without
the risk of wasting time on a false alarm. If the execution does not violate
the specification, the witness might have represented a false alarm and the
developer can assign a lower priority to that report.
Witnesses as Communication Interface. One barrier for the adoption of
verification technology is that developers have to spend considerable time on
understanding a verification tool and on becoming familiar with it. Thus, we have
to avoid the “lock-in” effect: people might not want to decide for one particular
tool if they have to invest time again when they wish to change the decision
later. If the developer constructs the integration on top of the exchangeable
verification witnesses, i.e., using the witnesses as interface to the verification tools,
the verification tool is exchangeable without any change to the testing process. 3
Tests from Witnesses. In order to flexibly bridge the gap from witness to test,
we provide two independently developed implementations of tools that take as
input a program and a violation witness, and synthesize a test that is compilable
1 https://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2017/systems.php
2 It has been shown that model checkers can be effective in constructing useful tests [12].
3 At least 21 verifiers are available that produce witnesses in the exchangeable format
(cf. Table 1, which lists the verifiers that we use in our experiments).
1 extern void __VERIFIER_error(void);
2 extern unsigned char
↪→ __VERIFIER_nondet_uchar(void);
3 int main(void) {
4 unsigned char a =
↪→ __VERIFIER_nondet_uchar();
5 unsigned char b =
↪→ __VERIFIER_nondet_uchar();
6 unsigned char sum = a + b;
7 unsigned char mean = sum / 2;










4: a == 2
o/w










4 static unsigned int
↪→ test_vector_index = 0;
5 unsigned char retval;
6 switch (test_vector_index) {
7 case 0: retval = 2U; break;





(c) Injection of test values
Fig. 1: An incorrect example C program (a), the corresponding violation witness
produced by the verifier (b), and a code fragment used to inject the extracted
test values for compilation (c)
and executable. This approach provides the following three features: (1) the
result of a verification tool can be validated by compiling and executing the
corresponding test—if the test violates the specification, the verification tool
reported a correct alarm and the result can be handled appropriately; (2) the
synthesized unit tests can be stored and maintained together with the other unit
tests, but can also be re-constructed at any time on demand; (3) independently
from the verification tool that produced the witness, the full repertoire for
inspecting a failing program—such as debuggers, profilers, and visualization tools—
can be used by the developer to understand the bug that the test represents.
Experimental Study. To evaluate our proposal, we performed experiments
on thousands of witnesses. We took many C programs from the largest public
repository of verification tasks and many witness-producing verification tools,
and collected 13 200 witnesses of specification violations. We obtained another
5 766 refined witnesses using witness refinement, a procedure introduced in the
original work on verification witnesses [9]. This technique is supposed to refine
witnesses to be more concrete, so we should be able to generate better test
cases from them. In conjunction with the two existing validators, CPAchecker
and Ultimate Automizer, our method significantly increases the confirmation
rate: out of the total of 18 966 witnesses, we were able to extract test cases for
10 080 of them, meaning that we successfully created and executed the tests, and
the specification violation was observed. Using the new approach, we increased
the confirmed results from 12 821 to 14 727 in total.
Example. In the following, we illustrate the complete process from running a
verification task using a verifier through synthesizing the test code from the
violation witness to compiling the program and executing it.
Fig. 1a shows a program that attempts to calculate the mean of two integer
numbers, a computation that is often required in binary-search algorithms.
4 The example also works for larger data types, but for ease of presentation, we aim to
keep the range of values small, so that all calculations can be followed by hand.
In lines 4 and 5, two variables a and b of type unsigned char 4 are initialized
nondeterministically, for example from user input. The subsequent lines are
supposed to calculate the mean of the two variables, by first computing their
sum in line 6 and then dividing it by 2 in line 7. If the mean of a and b has been
calculated correctly, it must not be less than half of either of the two values.
This condition is asserted in lines 8 to 10. We can check whether the condition is
satisfied by specifying that the function __VERIFIER_error() must not be reachable,
and then running a verifier on this verification task. The verifier should detect and
report that the assertion will be violated if the sum of a and b exceeds the range
of the data type unsigned char, causing an overflow. Fig. 1b shows a violation-
witness automaton [9] that represents a counterexample to the specification. The
automaton specifies that if we assume that a is assigned the value 2 in line 4 and b is
assigned the value 254 in line 5, control will flow to the then-branch in line 8, causing
a violation of the specification. To independently validate this witness, we can then
extract the input values for a and b, and use them to provide an implementation of
the input function __VERIFIER_nondet_uchar() and the __VERIFIER_error() function as
depicted in Fig. 1c. After compiling Fig. 1a and 1c into an executable and running
it, we can confirm that these input values trigger the call to __VERIFIER_error()
by checking its return code. We can even use a debugger such as GDB to step
through the compiled program and observe the faulty behavior directly. The
debugger will show that the sum of a and b, respectively 2 and 254, computed in
line 6 wraps around to 0. Therefore, the mean is incorrectly calculated as 0 in
line 7. The condition in line 8 then evaluates to 1, because 0 is smaller than 1.
It must be noted that the witness depicted in Fig. 1b is very precise: it provides
a concrete counterexample with explicit values for a and b. But in general, a
violation witness may simply describe a part of the state space that contains
a specification violation, i.e., an abstract counterexample. Suppose a verifier is
only able to provide a witness that specifies that if a + b is greater than 255 in
line 6, the specification will be violated. By using witness refinement [9], we can
obtain from this abstract witness a concrete witness like Fig. 1b.
Contributions. Our approach features the following advantages:
– Verification tools sometimes produce false alarms, which can lead to severe
waste of investigation time. We synthesize tests from verification witnesses,
and consequently trust only verification results confirmed by test execution.
– There are several witness-based validators available, but our execution-based
validation of the error path can be more precise and more efficient, compared
to the previously available validators.
– Avoidance of technology lock-in: A developer’s work flow does not depend on
a particular choice of verification tool, because the developer’s infrastructure
hooks in at the witness. The developer may elect to use a different verifier, or
even use multiple verifiers simultaneously—at no additional cost.
– Compared to working with witnesses, developers are more familiar with tests,
and more supporting tools—such as profilers, memory analyzers, and visualiza-
tion tools—are available to analyze the tests that correspond to the witnesses.
– The newly generated tests can complement the existing test suite, and the
tests as well as the witnesses can be stored and maintained as first-class objects
in the software life cycle.
Related Work. Our approach is based on a number of existing ideas, which
we outline in the following.
Verification Witnesses. We build our contributions on top of existing work on
violation witnesses [9], which we will describe in more detail in the background
section. The problem that verification results are not treated well enough by
the developers of verification tools is known and there are also other works that
address the same problem, for example, the work on execution reports [18].
Test-Case Generation. The idea to generate test cases from verification counterex-
amples is more than ten years old [6, 48], has since been used to create debuggable
executables [39, 42], and was extended and combined to various successful auto-
matic test-case generation approaches [25, 27, 36, 46]. We complement existing
techniques in the following ways: Our technique works on the flexible exchange
format for violation witnesses. In case such a witness constitutes only an abstract
counterexample, we can use witness refinement to efficiently obtain a concrete
one [9]. Such a mechanism is not available for existing test-case generation tools.
Execution. Other approaches [16, 22, 35] focus on creating tests from concrete and
tool-specific counterexamples. In contrast, our approach does not require full coun-
terexamples, but works on more flexible, possibly abstract, violation witnesses.
Debugging and Visualization. Besides executing a test, it is important to un-
derstand the cause of the error path, and there are tools and methods to
debug and visualize program paths [3, 7, 28].
2 Background
A verification witness is an exchangeable object that stores valuable information
about the verification process and the verification result. The key is that the
format is open and exchangeable, and that many verification tools support it.
Witness Construction. It has been commonly established practice for verifiers
to provide a counterexample to witness a specification violation, in particular
since counterexamples were used to refine abstract models [21]. The problem was
that these counterexamples were more or less ‘dumps’ of paths through the state
space, sometimes not human-readable, sometimes not machine-readable. Recent
efforts of the software-verification community established a common exchange
format for verification results as verification witnesses [9]. In this format, a so-
called violation-witness automaton (as seen in Fig. 1b) describes a state space
that contains the specification violation. This state space does not necessarily
have to represent just a single error path, but may contain multiple error paths
and even paths without a specification violation. As an example for the use of
verification witnesses, the International Competition on Software Verification
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Fig. 3: Concept of witness refinement with example abstract and refined witnesses
for the example program depicted in Figure 1a from the introduction
corresponding violation witness is reported and confirmed [4]. Figure 2 illustrates
the process: the verifiers can be exchanged according to the needs of the user,
there is no risk of technology lock-in. Figure 2 also shows that the exchange
format for witnesses has recently been extended to correctness witnesses [8]. In
the remainder of this paper, however, we will only consider violation witnesses.
Witness Refinement. The original work on verification witnesses [9] contains
the proposal to consider refinement of witnesses. The idea is to take a violation
witness as input, replay it with a validating verifier, and produce a new witness
that is more detailed. A more detailed violation witness is closer to a concrete
program path and makes the validation process faster. We will later in this paper













Fig. 4: Violation-witness validation
tools towards being able to successfully derive tests from witnesses. Figure 3a
illustrates the optional step of using witness-refining validators to strengthen
a witness. Figure 3b shows another, valid violation witness for the previously
considered program from Figure 1a. In contrast to the witness in Fig. 1b, this
witness does not specify any concrete values for the two nondeterministic val-
ues of variables a and b, but specifies that a property violation occurs if the
intermediate variables sum and mean are both equal to 0. This witness automaton
represents a set of 256 different counterexamples: every counterexample with
values for a and b, so that a + b == 0 during execution. Figure 3c shows a vi-
olation witness that is a refinement of the more abstract witness in Fig. 3b
that additionally specifies concrete values for the two variables a and b and
thus restricts the search space in witness validation early on.
Witness Validation. Violation witnesses can be used to independently re-
establish the verification result by using a witness-based result validator that
takes the information from the witness to find a path through the state space of
the program to a specification violation. Thus, a successful validation increases
trust in the verification result, and developers no longer need to rely on the
verifiers alone. Instead, they can focus their attention on the validated results and
assign a lower priority to unconfirmed alarms. The existing witness-based result
validators employ potentially-expensive model-checking techniques to replay error
paths that are represented in the witness. While this is a powerful technique (it can
reconstruct error paths even for abstract witnesses), the technique still has the lim-
itations of common program-analysis and model-checking techniques, namely that
the technique may over-approximate the semantics of the programming language,
thus potentially confirming false alarms or rejecting valid violation witnesses.
As a solution to this, we propose an execution-based approach to witness-based
result validation. Figure 4 shows the two existing validators CPAchecker and
Ultimate Automizer together with the two new, execution-based validators that






























Fig. 5: Software verification with witnesses: construction, (optional) refinement,
and validation work flow
3 Tests from Witnesses
This section introduces a new, yet unexplored, application of witnesses that can
easily be integrated into established processes for verification-result validation,
as summarized by Fig. 5. The highlighted area in Fig. 5 outlines the goal: for a
given violation witness, we want to construct a test that can be compiled and
executed to check that the bug is realizable. In particular, driven by our desire
to keep the work-flow independent from special verifiers, we want to have two
independently developed implementations of such witness-to-test tools.
Our new, execution-based witness validator does not require the aid of model-
checking techniques for validating verification results: we generate a test harness
(test code for the program), which can be compiled and linked together with
the original subject program and executed. If the execution does not trigger the
described bug, the witness is deemed spurious, i.e., not realizable.
Adding this new tool to the pool of available witness-based result validators
not only increases the diversity of validation techniques and its potential for
establishing trust in verification results, but also adds novel features to the
validation process: As a valuable by-product of a successful validation, the
developers are able to obtain executable test code that is guaranteed to reproduce
the bug in their system, and they can use all of the infrastructure for inspecting
and debugging that they are trained and experienced in and that is already
in place in their development environment. For example, a C developer might
simply run GDB to step through the executable error path.
Figure 6 shows the complete picture of execution-based witness validation.
The verification task (a given program with a given specification) is verified
by a chosen verifier. If the verifier reports a specification violation (False,
bug found) it also produces a violation witness. (Our work does not consider
the outcome True, for which the development of practical support, such as
correctness witnesses [8] and compact proof witnesses [32], is also a subject
of ongoing research.) The witness in GraphML format [15] is then given to
witness2test, which synthesizes a test harness that drives the program to the
specification violation. In order to support our claim of independence from any

























Fig. 6: Flow of execution-based result validation
of witness2test, namely CPA-witness2test (based on open-source components
from CPAchecker) and FShell-witness2test (based on ideas from FShell).
The test-harness and the original (unchanged) program are then compiled and
linked to obtain an executable program. The executable program is then executed
in a safe execution container.5 If the reported specification violation is observed
during this execution, the witness is confirmed. Otherwise the witness is not
confirmed, most likely because the witness is not precise enough or even spurious.
3.1 CPA-witness2test
One of our implementations for the witness2test component of the architecture
outlined in Fig. 6 is CPA-witness2test, which is based on the CPAchecker
framework [11]. For our purpose of matching an input witness to the program
source code of a verification task and generating a test harness, we configure
CPAchecker to use the witness automaton as a protocol automaton [9] to
guide and restrict the state-space exploration to the program paths that the
witness represents. Unlike observer automata [44], which we use to represent
the specification and which can only monitor the state-space exploration of an
analysis, protocol automata may also restrict the state-space exploration, for
example to a specific program path, thereby guiding the analysis along that path.
In our case, this path is the error path represented by the protocol automaton.
We configure the analysis to only consider the (syntactical) branching information
of the protocol automaton and to not semantically analyze the path. During this
protocol analysis, we observe which input-value assumptions from the witness
correspond to which input function or variable of the program. By collecting
this information, we are able to construct a test vector for the program. The
test vector maps an input value to each input variable and a list of input values
to each external function. We synthesize a test harness from a test vector by
providing initializations for input variables and definitions for external functions.
An external function with a list (v0, . . . , vn−1) of n ∈ N input values is defined by
using a switch statement with n cases over a static counter variable 0 ≤ i < n that
is initialized to 0 and incremented after each call to the function. Each case of the
5 We choose BenchExec [13] as container solution, because it is also used by SV-COMP.
switch statement corresponds to an input value, such that case i selects vi. We also
inject a call to the exit function so that when we later execute the program, we
can detect that the intended violation of the specification was triggered, i.e., the
program crashed precisely due to the bug described by the witness, by checking
for a specific execution return value. Fig. 1c shows the exit(107)-call in line 2
and a definition of an input function __VERIFIER_nondet_uchar() in lines 3 to 12 as
generated by CPA-witness2test, where the counter variable test_vector_index
represents i. The switch statement in this function definition provides sequential
access to the two input values (2, 254) that CPA-witness2test extracted from
the witness of Fig. 1b for the program shown in Fig. 1a.
3.2 FShell-witness2test
The key design principle of FShell-witness2test is independence from existing
verification infrastructure: FShell-witness2test’s results shall—by design—be
unbiased towards any existing software-analysis framework. While this does imply
limitations on the class of witnesses that can be processed as discussed below,
it does yield further advantages: FShell-witness2test is easy to extend for
prototyping, and does not require any background in software verification.
FShell-witness2test comprises two major parts: (1) A Python-based pro-
cessor of the witness and the input program, using pycparser6 to generate
test vectors in a format compatible with FShell [31]. (2) A Perl script that
translates such test vectors into a test harness.
For a given verification task and witness, FShell-witness2test first parses
the specification to restrict itself to reachability properties (call to error function
should not be reachable). The witness and the C program are then handed
to the Python-based processor. The specification defines the entry function
to be used by the generated test harness.
As pycparser cannot handle various GCC extensions, input programs are
preprocessed and sanitized by performing text replacement and removal. We
then obtain the abstract syntax tree and iterate over its nodes to gather data
types and source locations of (1) all procedure-local uninitialized variables,
(2) all functions with prefix __VERIFIER_nondet, and (3) all uses of such func-
tions. We refer to the locations of uninitialized variables and nondeterministic-
input function uses as watch points.
Finally we build a linear sequence of nodes from the GraphML encoding
of the witness. Traversing this sequence, any match of line numbers against
the watch points triggers an attempt to extract values from assumptions in
the witness. If parsing the C code that is contained in the assumption suc-
ceeds, then an input value is recorded.
The test vector is compatible with the output of FShell; the program
of Fig. 1 yields the following test vector:
IN:
ENTRY main()@[file mean.c line 1]
unsigned char __VERIFIER_nondet_uchar()@[file mean.c line 4]=2
unsigned char __VERIFIER_nondet_uchar()@[file mean.c line 5]=254
6 https://github.com/eliben/pycparser
Such a test vector is translated to a Makefile that generates an actual test
harness, which consists of invocation code and the implementation of various
nondeterministic-input functions that are present in the program. FShell-wit-
ness2test reports False (confirming the violation) if, and only if, the property
violation is detected in the output of the test execution.
4 Evaluation
We perform a large experimental study to demonstrate the general applica-
bility and the advantages of our approach.
4.1 Evaluation Goals
The goal of our experimental evaluation is to collect experience with our
new kind of result validation and to support the following claims with data
for a large set of witnesses:
Claim 1: Execution-based validators can confirm violation witnesses that the
existing validators (which are based on model-checking technology) can not
validate. Thus, execution-based validation increases the overall effectiveness.
Claim 2: Result validation based on executable tests can be faster than result
validation based on model-checking technology.
Claim 3: Violation witnesses in the common exchange format for verification
results (cf. Sect. 2) are a valuable source to synthesize test code for specification
violations to complement existing test suites.
4.2 Experiment Setup
We used the benchmarking framework BenchExec (revision fb32a3e7) to con-
duct our experiments. In order to experimentally evaluate our approach, we
first construct a large set of witnesses that is diverse in terms of (a) subject
programs and (b) verification tools that create witnesses.
Subject Programs. For (a), we consider the largest available set of verification
tasks 7 from the community of automatic software verification and select all
5 692 verification tasks with a reachability property 8.
Verifiers. For (b), we use all verification tools that participated in SV-COMP
2017 for property ReachSafety and whose license allows us to use it 9. Table 1
lists all verifiers that we executed to produce violation witnesses. The table lists
in the first column the verifier name with a link to the project web site for more
information, and a reference to the paper describing the corresponding verifier.
For the experiments, we took the archives from the competition web site. 10
7 https://github.com/sosy-lab/sv-benchmarks/tree/423cf8c
8 We have to restrict the experiments to property ReachSafety because there were no
witness validators available for the other properties.
9 There are also two commercial verifiers that produce witnesses, but we cannot use
them due to their proprietary license.
10 https://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2017/systems.php
Table 1: Violation witnesses produced by verifiers and resulting tests
Verifier Produced witnesses Produced tests
Unref. Ref. Total Count kLOC kB # Inputs (Avg.)
2ls [45] 992 384 1 376 1 208 89.9 3 999 7.57
Blast [47] 778 202 980 327 29.0 938 0.271
Cbmc [34] 831 467 1 298 1 249 67.7 2 991 6.33
Ceagle 619 426 1 045 540 92.2 262 5.39
CPA-BAM-BnB [2] 851 175 1 026 158 42.9 1 114 0
CPA-kInd [10] 263 193 456 656 56.2 2 967 14.9
CPA-Seq [23] 883 767 1 650 838 95.5 3 895 1.79
DepthK [43] 1 159 305 1 464 1 302 65.4 3 170 2.96
Esbmc [37] 653 148 801 478 21.0 1 983 2.53
Esbmc-falsi [37] 981 395 1 376 1 133 53.7 1 906 1.81
Esbmc-incr [37] 970 392 1 362 1 126 53.5 1 896 1.82
Esbmc-kInd [24] 847 352 1 199 1 028 48.9 1 774 1.69
Forester [30] 51 0 51 0 0 0 -
PredatorHP [33] 86 61 147 80 17.2 434 0
Skink [17] 30 25 55 44 0.290 8 0
Smack [41] 871 632 1 503 1 576 128 5 654 6.09
Symbiotic [19] 927 411 1 338 589 38.1 1 375 0
SymDIVINE [38] 247 224 471 405 13.4 580 0
UAutomizer [29] 514 70 584 121 2.24 59 0
UKojak [40] 309 67 376 116 2.15 55 0
UTaipan [26] 338 70 408 121 2.23 59 0
Total 13 200 5 766 18 966 13 095 920 35 119 5.60
Collection of Witnesses. From the given verification tasks and verifiers, we
started verification runs and collected the obtained violation witnesses. For this
replication of the SV-COMP experiments we followed thoroughly the description
on the competition web site 10 and in the report [4]. In particular, we started
each verifier only on those verification tasks and with those parameters that were
declared by the development teams of the verifiers11. The number of witnesses that
we obtained with this process is reported in Table 1 (col. ‘Unref.’). Because we
use all available verifiers (not only those that performed well in the competition),
the set of witnesses contains also bad witnesses (e.g., that are syntactically
incorrect). We did not want to exclude them for external validity.
To further increase the external validity of our evaluation, we additionally
produced witnesses by applying a witness-refinement technique (cf. Sect. 2) to
13 200 witnesses above. We used the witness-refiner from the CPAchecker frame-
work for this step. This refinement is often able to improve imprecise witnesses
by adding concrete input values, and yields another 5 766 witnesses (col. ‘Ref.’)
to a total of 18 966 witnesses (col. ‘Total’) that we will run our experiments on.
In order to highlight the differences between model-checking-based vali-
dation approaches and execution-based validation approaches, we manually
crafted some verification tasks and corresponding witnesses. These witnesses
11 https://github.com/sosy-lab/sv-comp/tree/svcomp17/benchmark-defs
Table 2: Confirmed witnesses and verification results
Static validators Dynamic validators Union
CPAchecker Automizer Union CPA-w2t FShell-w2t Union
Confirmed witnesses 11 225 7 595 12 821 7 151 7 545 10 080 14 727
Unref. witnesses 5 750 3 450 7 214 3 506 3 459 5 082 9 056
Ref. witnesses 5 475 4 145 5 607 3 645 4 086 4 998 5 671
Incorrectly confirmed 18 7 25 6 0 6 31
Confirmed verif. results 5 751 5 643 7 215 5 377 5 755 7 292 9 057
Incorrectly confirmed 15 7 22 6 0 6 22
allow us a more detailed discussion of some effects, but were not added to
our set of automatically generated witnesses.
Computing Resources. Our experiments were conducted on machines with an
Intel Xeon E3-1230 v5 CPU, with 8 processing units each, a frequency of 3.4GHz,
33GB of RAM, and a GNU/Linux operating system (x86_64-linux, Ubuntu 16.04
with Linux kernel 4.4). We limited the verification runs to four processing units
(i.e., two physical cores), 7GB of memory, and 15min of CPU time, and the
witness-refinement and validation runs to two processing units (i.e., one physical
core), 4GB of memory, and 1.5min of CPU time. All CPU times are reported
with two significant digits. The limits are inspired by SV-COMP.
Validators. We used CPA-witness2test in revision 24 475 from CPAchecker
and FShell-witness2test in revision 2a76669f from the test-gen branch. We
used the model-checking based witness validators CPAchecker, revision 24 475,
and Ultimate Automizer 0.1.8.
4.3 Availability of Data and Tools
All tools and all data obtained in our experiments are available via our supple-
mentary web page. 12 The verification tasks are also publicly available. 7
4.4 Results
Claim 1: Effectiveness. Table 2 reports the number of witnesses that the
individual validators were able to confirm. In the columns, it shows: the results of
the static validators CPAchecker and Ultimate Automizer, as well as the union
of these two; the results of the dynamic validators CPA-w2t and FShell-w2t, as
well as the union of these two; and the results of the union of all four validators.
The union is the number of witnesses that at least one of the considered validators
was able to confirm, i.e., one of CPAchecker and Ultimate Automizer (col. 4),
or one of CPA-w2t and FShell-w2t (col. 7), or any of the four (col. 8). In
the rows, Table 2 is divided into confirmed witnesses (unrefined and refined
witnesses, as well as incorrectly confirmed witnesses) and confirmed verification
results. A witness is incorrectly confirmed if the verification result reported
by a verifier is wrong and the validator reached the same, wrong conclusion
using the verification-result witness that was provided by the verifier. Since
for each unrefined witness from a verifier, a refined counterpart may exist, the
number of confirmed witnesses is potentially double the number of verification
12 https://www.sosy-lab.org/research/executionbasedwitnessvalidation/
Table 3: Performance comparison for witnesses that all validators confirmed
(CPU time for 2 685 witnesses)
CPAchecker Automizer CPA-w2t FShell-w2t
Total time (s) 20 000 45 000 30 000 1 900
Average time (s) 7.4 17 11 0.72
Median time (s) 6.2 11 5.9 0.71
results that were confirmed using these witnesses. Because of this, Table 2 also
reports the number of confirmed verification results. We considered a verification
result as confirmed if at least one of its witnesses is confirmed by the used
validators. This can be the unrefined witness, or, if it exists, the refined one.
The results of Table 2 show that the static validators together confirmed a total
of 12 821 verification results, while the dynamic validators together confirmed
a total of 10 080 results. Also, the two different validation techniques confirm
different results: a union of 14 727 results were confirmed by both validation
techniques together. Of the verification results that neither of the static validators
was able to confirm, CPA-w2t was able to confirm 735 and FShell-w2t was
able to confirm 1 488, meaning that the techniques complement each other well.
Together, they were able to confirm 1 842 results that no static validator was able
to confirm. This shows that the independently developed dynamic techniques
complement each other because they are based on completely different technology.
It is also interesting to consider wrong witnesses, i.e., violation witnesses that
constitute false alarms. In our experiments, the verifiers produced 679 false alarms.
Of these, the static approaches incorrectly confirmed 22 wrong witnesses (of
different programs), while FShell-w2t did not wrongly confirm any false alarms.
CPA-w2t confirmed 6 wrong witnesses incorrectly, all based on programs that
contain floating-point arithmetic. For these, CPA-w2t has only limited support.
Despite that, this highlights a high precision of our execution-based approach. In
sum, using dynamic validators in addition to static validators can significantly
increase the number of successfully validated verification results.
Claim 2: Efficiency. Table 3 considers only results that were confirmed by all
validators, to compare the execution performance. For the dynamic validators, the
reported run time contains all three steps: generating the test from the witness,
compiling and linking, and executing the test. The results show that the static
approaches are slow (CPAchecker and Ultimate Automizer), that the approach
that assembled a static analysis for test generation from CPAchecker components
is also slow (CPA-w2t), and that the light-weight implementation that is specifi-
cally tailored to generating tests from witnesses is extremely fast (FShell-w2t).
Figure 7 displays quantile functions that show for each validator the necessary
maximal CPU time (y-axis) for confirming a certain quantile of results (x-axis).
We observe that FShell-w2t significantly outperforms all other validators.
Interestingly, in our validation we observed that the witnesses that require the
most time to validate are witnesses that are large in size and that describe a long,
detailed error path. Most of these are produced by verifiers that use bounded

























Fig. 7: Quantile plot for CPU time consumed for validating witnesses accepted
by all validators
Claim 3: Test Generation. The last four columns of Table 1 relate the number
of witnesses that we processed to the number of produced tests for which failing
executions are realizable. With ‘produced tests’ we refer to the tests that were
produced by any of the dynamic validators and for which the test execution lead to
an observed specification violation. Note that because we collect tests from both
dynamic validators, the numbers of produced tests exceed the number of witnesses
in some rows. Since the tests are available in source code, and could be maintained
and re-used by developers in practical application scenarios, we also report the
size of these unit tests in lines of code, file size, and the average number of input
values per generated unit test. The table shows that the number of unit tests and
the accompanying size of test code that the approach can produce are significant.
The results confirm that we are able to provide an interface to verification tools via
witnesses and tests that avoids technology lock-in and which enables developers to
explore the verification results using tools and techniques they are familiar with.
The combination of software verification and execution-based result validation
may also be used to automatically extend the existing test suites of a project.
4.5 Detailed Discussion of Synthetic Examples
Now we discuss a few effects in more detail on hand-crafted example witnesses.
Bugs that occur after only few loop iterations are also known as shallow bugs, as
opposed to deep bugs that occur after many loop iterations. One of the strengths
of dynamic validation approaches is that long loops can simply be executed, while
model checkers usually need to perform expensive symbolic unrolling to reveal
deep bugs, which is therefore a more difficult task for them than discovering
shallow bugs. Thus, we expect the set of witnesses obtained from model checkers
to consist mostly of shallow bugs, while at the same time we must expect that
the advantages of test-based validation become most apparent for witnesses for
1 extern void
↪→ __VERIFIER_error(void);
2 extern unsigned int
↪→ __VERIFIER_nondet_uint(void);
3 int main() {
4 unsigned int n =
↪→ __VERIFIER_nondet_uint();
5 if (n < 1) return 0;
6 if (n > 1000000) return 0;
7 unsigned int sum = 0;
8 for (int i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
9 sum = sum + i;
10 if (i == 10000) {
11 sum = sum + 1;
12 }
13 }













(a) “gauss” code, witness
1 extern void
↪→ __VERIFIER_error(void);
2 extern unsigned int
↪→ __VERIFIER_nondet_uint(void);
3 int main(void) {
4 unsigned int x =
↪→ __VERIFIER_nondet_uint();
5 unsigned int y = x + 1;
6 unsigned int i = 0;


















(b) “loop-1” code, witness
1 extern void __VERIFIER_error();
2 extern unsigned int
↪→ __VERIFIER_nondet_uint(void);
3 int main() {
4 unsigned int n =
↪→ __VERIFIER_nondet_uint();
5 unsigned int x=n, y=0;























(c) “loop-2” code, witnesses
Fig. 8: Hand-crafted tasks and witnesses
deeper bugs, which necessitate many unrollings. Therefore, we hand-crafted a
small set of verification tasks and witnesses, including the example for computing
the mean from Fig. 1a in the introduction, to exemplify the differences between
the test-based approaches and those based on model checking.
Fig. 8a shows an example program intended to compare the iterative sum of
ascending values with the result of the Gauss sum formula, and a witness for a
bug in the program. The bug is located in lines 10 to 12 and causes an error for
inputs larger than or equal to 10 000. The depicted witness for this bug assigns
an input value of 10 000. Fig. 8b shows an example program that increments
two variables x and y 1 000 000 times and then asserts their equality in line 12,
and a witness for a violation of this assertion. Since y is initialized to x + 1 in
line 5, the assertion will fail for any value of x. The depicted witness for this bug
assigns an input value of 0. Fig. 8c shows an example program with a variable n
initialized with an input function in line 4 and copies its value to a variable x in
line 5. In the same line, a variable y is initialized to 0. Then, in lines 6 to 9, x is
decremented and simultaneously y is incremented, until x is 0, so essentially, y
counts the loop iterations, and n−x = y is a loop invariant. Consequently, y must
be equal to n at the end of the loop, and therefore the call to the error function
in line 11 is called for any input value, so that both witnesses in Fig. 8c are
valid counterexamples. The first of these witnesses, however, describes a violation
that skips the loop entirely with an input value of 0, while the second one, due
to assigning an input value of 1 000 000, reaches the violation in line 11 only
after 1 000 000 loop iterations. We expect all validators to quickly validate the
witnesses for shallow bugs, i.e., the one depicted in Fig. 1a and the first witness
in Fig. 8c, but we expect test-based validators to perform significantly better
on the witnesses for deep bugs, i.e., those depicted in Figs. 8a and 8b, and the
second witness in Fig. 8c. Table 4 reports the results for validating these tasks
and largely confirms our expectations. While CPAchecker exceeds its resource
Table 4: Validation of hand-crafted witnesses
Witness CPAchecker Automizer CPA-w2t FShell-w2t
Result Time (s) Result Time (s) Result Time (s) Result Time (s)
gauss M - 7 11 3 3.4 3 0.60
loop-1 T - 7 9.6 3 3.4 3 0.60
loop-2/wit-1 3 3.8 3 8.0 3 3.4 3 0.58
loop-2/wit-2 T - 3 7.5 3 3.2 3 0.58
mean 3 3.5 3 7.1 3 3.6 3 0.58
limitations (“M” for exceeding the memory limit, “T” for exceeding the CPU time
limit) for all witnesses except for the two that represent shallow bugs, CPA-w2t
and FShell-w2t quickly confirm all witnesses (3). It is somewhat surprising to
see that Ultimate Automizer is able to confirm the loop-2/wit-2 of Fig. 8c.
Checking the tool output, however, reveals that Ultimate Automizer ignored
the input value of n specified by the witness and used 0 instead of 1 000 000.
We were also surprised that the witnesses in the first two rows were rejected by
Ultimate Automizer (7), but since the confirmations of the execution-based
validators along with their trustworthy executable tests give us confidence that
the witnesses are correct, we assume that the rejections are either caused by
the complexity of validating the witnesses or by an approximating behavior of
Ultimate Automizer similar to the one leading to the rejection of loop-2/wit-2.
Overall, we confirm that for this class of witnesses, dynamic approaches are
more efficient and more effective than static approaches.
5 Conclusion
Developers are familiar with testing, and there are many tools available for bug
analysis that are based on execution, such as debuggers. We try to close the gap
between available verification tools and the desire for more precise bug finding
by leveraging verification witnesses in an exchangeable standard format. We
synthesize tests (test code) from verification results (witnesses) and check the
tests for realizability by compiling them, linking them together with the original
program, and executing the result in an isolating container. Prior to our work,
developers would execute a verification tool and obtain the verification results,
which include a violation witness in case a bug is found. Now, we can use the
violation witness to obtain a test that drives the program to the specification
violation (i.e., into the crash that the developer wants to investigate), while
at the same time, we avoid verification-tool lock-in due to the exchangeable
standard format. The approach reports only those tests to the developer that
really expose the bug; any false alarms are suppressed. The results of our thorough
experimental study are encouraging: We verified thousands of programs from
the largest publicly-available collection of C verification tasks, consisting of
73million lines of source code (2.3GB), and synthesized tests that confirmed
7 286 verification results exposing known bugs in 974 different verification tasks.
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